Full client-facing reference: auth, all routes with schemas and curl examples, selection/cooldown semantics, caveats. README and architecture.md link to it. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Architecture
Components
| Component | Package | Runs as | Leader-elected | Role |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Proxy CRD + helpers | api/v1alpha1 |
types | — | Proxy spec/status, CEL validation, defaulting, pure helpers |
| Reconciler | internal/controller |
controller | yes (with the manager) | the state machine: provision, replace, delete, represent health |
| Provider contract | internal/provider |
library | — | Provider interface, error taxonomy, deterministic naming, config, metrics decorator |
| kubernetes provider | internal/provider/kubernetes |
library | — | real Squid pods in this cluster (local dev/CI) |
| gcp provider | internal/provider/gcp |
library | — | Compute Engine VMs, four API calls, fire-and-forget ops |
| Health engine | internal/health |
Runnable | yes | through-the-proxy probes, thresholds, transition events |
| Lease store | internal/lease |
Runnable (expiry sweep) | no | in-memory leases + cooldowns, single mutex |
| Discovery API | internal/discovery |
Runnable | no | HTTP list/lease/release/report on :8090 |
| Orphan GC | internal/gc |
Runnable | yes | deletes tagged instances whose CR is gone |
| Metrics | internal/metrics |
library | — | explicit registration, scrape-time collectors |
| Composition root | cmd/main.go |
binary | — | flags, provider registry, wires everything onto one manager |
Event flow: cluster events → reconciler functions
Which functions run in response to which Kubernetes cluster events, as
wired in internal/controller/proxy_controller.go.
1. How cluster events reach the reconciler
KUBERNETES CLUSTER EVENTS (wiring: SetupWithManager,
───────────────────────── proxy_controller.go)
Proxy CR created / spec edited / Secret created / health transition
status patched / delete requested updated / deleted (engine, see §6)
│ │ │
watch: For(&crawlv1alpha1.Proxy{}) watch: Watches( WatchesRawSource(
│ &corev1.Secret{}, ...) source.Channel(
│ │ r.HealthEvents, ...))
│ r.proxiesForSecret(ctx, secret) │
│ │ r.List(Proxies in namespace) │
│ │ keeps those whose │
│ │ spec.cloudInit.secretRef matches │
│ ▼ │
│ [reconcile.Request per matching Proxy] │
▼ │ │
┌────────────────────────────────────┴──────────────────────────┴──┐
│ controller-runtime workqueue │◄── RequeueAfter
│ (dedup by namespace/name, rate-limited, │ timers
│ MaxConcurrentReconciles: 3) │◄── error backoff
└──────────────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────┘
▼
ProxyReconciler.Reconcile(ctx, req)
The Secret watch makes rotating a cloud-init Secret a first-class event: it re-enqueues every Proxy referencing that Secret, which is how secret rotation triggers VM replacement even though the Proxy spec is untouched.
2. Inside Reconcile — dispatch and the single status write
Reconcile(ctx, req)
│ r.Get(ctx, req.NamespacedName, &p) ── fetch the Proxy (NotFound → done)
│ base := p.DeepCopy() ── snapshot for the diff
│ defer patchStatusIfChanged(ctx, base, &p) ──────────────────────────┐
│ │
├─ p.DeletionTimestamp set ──► reconcileDelete(ctx, &p) │
├─ p.Spec.Mode == External ──► reconcileExternal(ctx, &p) │
└─ otherwise (Managed) ──────► reconcileManaged(ctx, &p) │
▼
patchStatusIfChanged (status.go)
│ p.Status.ObservedGeneration = p.Generation
│ p.Status.Phase = computePhase(&p)
│ equality.Semantic.DeepEqual(base, p)?
└─ changed → r.Status().Patch(...) ◄── the ONLY
unchanged → no API call status write
3. reconcileManaged — the state machine
reconcileManaged(ctx, p)
│
├─ controllerutil.AddFinalizer? ──► r.Update ──► return {} (watch event re-triggers)
├─ permanent-failure latch (FindStatusCondition == PermanentError
│ at this generation) ──► return {} (silent until spec edit)
├─ r.Providers[p.Spec.Provider] missing ──► setProvisioned(PermanentError) → Failed
│
├─ resolveCloudInit(ctx, p) ──► r.Get(Secret) if secretRef (error → CloudInitError + backoff)
├─ hash := specHash(p, cloudInit) (spechash.go)
│
├─ status.providerID == "" ─────────► prov.Create(CreateRequest{Name: NameFromUID(p.UID), ...})
│ │ setSpecHash → r.Update (annotation)
│ └ stage providerID + Provisioned=False/Provisioning
│ ──► RequeueAfter: ProvisioningPoll
│
├─ annotation != hash, annotation == "" ──► adopt: setSpecHash → r.Update
│ ──► RequeueAfter: RequeueNow
├─ annotation != hash, annotation != "" ──► replaceInstance:
│ prov.Get ─ NotFound → setSpecHash, clear ID/IP
│ │ ──► RequeueNow (next pass creates)
│ └ exists → prov.Delete, Provisioned=False/Replacing
│ ──► RequeueAfter: DeletionPoll
│
└─ annotation == hash ──► prov.Get(providerID)
├─ ErrNotFound ──► clear ID/IP ──► RequeueNow (next pass creates)
├─ Provisioning ──► Provisioned=False ──► ProvisioningPoll
├─ Running ──► status.ip = inst.IP,
│ Provisioned=True/Created,
│ applyHealth (see §6) ──► DriftPoll
└─ Stopped/Termin. ──► prov.Delete (cattle) ──► DeletionPoll
any provider error ──► providerFailure(p, err) ── provider.Class(err):
├─ ErrQuotaExceeded ──► condition QuotaExceeded ──► RequeueAfter: QuotaRetry (nil error)
├─ ErrPermanent ──► condition PermanentError ──► phase Failed, no retry
└─ ErrTransient ──► return err ──► workqueue exponential backoff
4. reconcileDelete and reconcileExternal
reconcileDelete(ctx, p) reconcileExternal(ctx, p)
├─ no finalizer ──► return {} │ status.ip = spec.endpoint.host
├─ providerID == "" ──► RemoveFinalizer │ setProvisioned(True/ExternalEndpoint)
│ → r.Update → object actually deleted │ applyHealth (see §6)
├─ prov.Get → ErrNotFound ──► RemoveFinalizer └─ return {} (no finalizer,
│ → r.Update → object actually deleted no provider calls ever)
└─ exists ──► prov.Delete
→ Provisioned=False/Deleting
──► RequeueAfter: DeletionPoll (poll until gone)
5. What provider calls do in the outside world
kubernetes pod provider (internal/provider/kubernetes/)
prov.Create ──► buildPod (pure) ──► client.Create(corev1.Pod) ─┐ these cause Pod events,
prov.Get ──► client.Get(Pod) → phase/IP → InstanceState │ but the operator does NOT
prov.Delete ──► client.Delete(Pod, tolerate NotFound) │ watch Pods — it observes
prov.ListByTag ─► client.List(Pods by labels, all namespaces) ─┘ them by polling prov.Get
on each RequeueAfter tick
gcp provider (internal/provider/gcp/) — instances.{Insert,Get,Delete,AggregatedList}, nothing else
prov.Create ──► buildInsertRequest (pure) ──► instances.Insert ─┐ fire-and-forget:
409 alreadyExists = success (idempotent retry) │ Operation.Wait is never
prov.Get ──► instances.Get → status/NatIP → InstanceState │ called; readiness is
RUNNING without NatIP = still Provisioning │ discovered by Get polls,
prov.Delete ──► instances.Delete (404 = success) │ exactly like the pod
prov.ListByTag ─► AggregatedList(label filter, ─┘ provider
ReturnPartialSuccess: true)
providerID = zones/<zone>/instances/<name> — zone-qualified, so Get/Delete
stay correct even mid-replacement after a zone edit
The reconciler never watches provider-side resources (Pods or GCP VMs).
All instance-state observation is poll-based through the Provider
interface, so the same flow works identically for a cloud API that has no
watch mechanism at all.
6. Health engine (internal/health/) — probes and transitions
The engine is a leader-elected manager Runnable with its own goroutines,
independent of the workqueue. It owns health state; the reconciler owns
its representation in status — that split keeps exactly one writer of
.status and makes write-only-on-transition fall out for free.
Engine.Start(ctx) (engine.go)
├─ spawns Workers (8) probe goroutines ◄─┐
└─ ticker loop (Tick = 1s): │ jobs channel (non-blocking send;
tick(ctx, now, jobs) │ saturated pool → retry next tick)
│ Reader.List(Proxies) ── from the manager cache
│ per proxy: skip if no IP/host or deleting (state pruned →
│ a replaced instance starts with fresh counters)
│ newState: seed verdict from an existing Healthy condition
│ (leader handover), jitter first probe across the interval
│ due && !inFlight ──► jobs ◄── probe worker picks up
└ prune states for proxies gone from the cache
│
probe(ctx, proxyURL, hc, tls) (probe.go)
│ fresh transport per probe, DisableKeepAlives=true
│ (load-bearing: keep-alives would cache the CONNECT
│ tunnel and later probes would never re-exercise it)
│ https probe URL ⇒ CONNECT through the proxy + TLS inside
└ success = err == nil AND expected status code
│
record(job, result, now) ── under one mutex
│ counters: consecOK/consecFail; verdict flips only at
│ successThreshold / failureThreshold
│ emit ONLY on: first-ever verdict │ threshold flip │
│ latency Δ > max(20ms, 50% of reported) rate-limited
│ to one report per MinReportInterval (60s)
▼
Events chan (buffered 64, non-blocking send;
on drop the reported markers do NOT advance → next probe retries)
│
▼
source.Channel → workqueue → Reconcile (see §1)
│
▼
r.applyHealth(p) ── reads Engine.Snapshot(key) (status.go)
stages the Healthy condition + latencyMillis +
lastHealthCheckTime; computePhase turns Provisioned=True
+ Healthy=True/False into phase Ready / Unhealthy
Consequence worth knowing: status.lastHealthCheckTime is the time of the
last status-affecting probe, not the most recent probe — suppressed
probes deliberately never write status. True probe recency will live in
metrics (Step 9).
7. Discovery + lease API (internal/discovery/, internal/lease/)
HTTP-driven, not cluster-event-driven: crawler clients call in; the only
Kubernetes interaction is reading Proxies from the manager's cache. The
server is a non-leader-elected Runnable (all replicas would serve, but the
deployment ships replicas: 1 because lease state is per-process — an
operator restart drops all leases and cooldowns, a documented caveat).
Client-facing reference with request/response schemas and curl examples:
api.md.
crawler client
│ Authorization: Bearer $DISCOVERY_TOKEN (empty token = auth disabled, loud startup warning)
▼
Server.handler() middleware, outermost first (server.go)
recover → request-log → MaxBytesReader(64KiB) → bearer auth (constant-time; /healthz exempt)
│
├─ GET /healthz ──► 200 ok (unauthenticated)
│
├─ GET /v1/proxies?attr.k=v&healthy=true (handlers.go)
│ Reader.List(Proxies) ── manager cache
│ filter: attributes equality + Healthy condition
│ + Store.Counts() for activeLeases
│ ──► 200 {"proxies":[...], "count":N} (empty list is 200, not 404)
│
├─ POST /v1/leases {"selector":{...},"ttlSeconds":300,"target":"..."}
│ Reader.List → filter selector; unhealthy matches counted, not offered
│ Store.Acquire(healthy candidates, target, ttl) ── one lock: select+insert
│ │ selection: fewest active leases, then latency, then name
│ ├─ granted ──► 201 {leaseID, proxy:{...}, expiresAt, ttlSeconds}
│ └─ ErrNoMatch ──► 409 {"error":"no_match", considered, atCapacity,
│ inCooldown, unhealthy}
│
├─ DELETE /v1/leases/{id} ──► Store.Release ──► always 204 (idempotent)
│
└─ POST /v1/leases/{id}/report {"result":"ok|rate_limited|banned","target":"..."}
Store.Report ── rate_limited/banned ⇒ cooldown[{proxy,target}] for
│ CooldownWindow (target falls back: report → lease → global)
├─ 204 │ 400 invalid_result │ 404 unknown_lease
└─ an expired lease still resolves for CooldownWindow past its TTL —
a late report lands exactly when the proxy is being rate-limited
Store.Start(ctx) ── manager Runnable, NOT leader-elected: sweeps expired
leases + cooldowns; correctness never depends on the
sweep (every read checks ExpiresAt against the clock)
8. Orphan GC (internal/gc/) — the crash-safety net
Timer-driven, leader-elected (destructive ⇒ single writer). Exists for the one gap the reconciler cannot close alone: a crash after a provider Create but before the status write that records the instance.
Sweeper.Start(ctx) ── refuses to run when the cache is namespace-
│ restricted unless --gc-allow-namespaced is explicit
│ (an incomplete live set would "orphan" live VMs)
└─ every Interval (10m; first sweep a full interval after start):
sweep(ctx)
│ Reader.List(Proxies) → live UID set
│ List fails → skip the whole sweep (never guess)
│ a CR with deletionTimestamp still counts as LIVE — its
│ finalizer owns that deletion; GC racing it double-deletes
└ per provider: ListByTag
│ error → log, continue with the next provider
└ delete only when ALL hold:
has the proxy-operator-uid label (ownership proof)
older than MinAge (10m) (not mid-create)
UID matches no existing CR (truly orphaned)
each kill logged loudly with provider, providerID, UID
9. Metrics (internal/metrics/)
Registered explicitly from cmd/main.go (no init(); tests use fresh
registries). Two kinds:
- Scrape-time collectors —
proxy_operator_proxies{phase}andproxy_operator_leases_activeread the cache / lease store at every scrape; reconcile-incremented gauges inevitably drift and leak series. - Fed vectors —
healthcheck_duration_seconds{proxy}andhealthcheck_failures_total{proxy}observe EVERY probe (status writes are transition-only; metrics carry the high-frequency signal), and the health engine deletes a proxy's series when it prunes its state;lease_requests_total{outcome}from the discovery handlers;provider_requests_total{provider,op,result}from theprovider.WithMetricsdecorator — the one placeClass()is called purely for observability.
Each consuming package defines its own small recorder interface
(health.ProbeMetrics, discovery.LeaseMetrics, provider.RequestRecorder);
metrics.Metrics satisfies all of them structurally, so no package other
than cmd/main.go imports the metrics package.
Decisions
Judgment calls the spec left open, and deliberate deviations — recorded so they read as choices, not accidents. Chronological by build step.
- Registry takes its constructor map as a parameter instead of holding a package-level map: avoids the provider⇄registry import cycle and puts the wiring at the composition root, where it is visible.
- Mock provider replaced by the kubernetes-pod provider (user
decision, mid-build): a simulated in-memory provider was too far from
the real system to build confidence in. Local dev/CI now runs real
ubuntu/squidpods (Canonical's actively maintained image, verified 50M+ pulls, pinned tag) in the operator's own cluster. Trade-off accepted: envtest has no kubelet, so end-to-end proof lives in the kind quickstart, and cluster pods share one egress IP — distinct egress paths remain the GCP provider's job. RequeueAfter: RequeueNowinstead of the plan'sRequeue: true:ctrl.Result.Requeueis deprecated in controller-runtime v0.24; a fifth configurable interval (default 1s) keeps identical semantics and stays shrinkable in tests.- Quota exhaustion is a wait, not a failure:
ErrQuotaExceededsets a condition and requeues slowly (5m) with a nil error — off the backoff curve, out of the error log, and neverphase: Failed. OnlyErrPermanentlatches Failed, keyed to the generation so a spec edit auto-recovers. - The finalizer path never latches permanent failures: a permanent error during deletion keeps retrying visibly instead — latching there would wedge the object forever with no path out but manual finalizer surgery.
- Health transitions travel reconciler-ward over a channel
(
source.Channel), not direct status patches:phasederives from both provisioning and health, so two status writers would race and flap. One writer of status; the engine owns health state, the reconciler its representation; write-only-on-transition falls out for free. - Health state seeds from the existing Healthy condition on leader handover (verdict kept, counters zeroed, first probe jittered), so a healthy fleet doesn't flap to Unknown on restart — but a real transition still needs a full threshold run. A never-probed proxy skips the jitter and probes on the next tick: startup spread matters for restarts, not for a single new proxy.
- Latency suppression is
max(20ms, 50%)+ a 60s rate limit, and only while the verdict is healthy. The spec's bare ">50% change" is undefined at 0 and lets a proxy jittering 40↔61ms write status forever; the healthy-only guard (found by test) stops a below-threshold success streak from emitting latency updates for a proxy still reported unhealthy. Consequence:status.lastHealthCheckTimemeans "last status-affecting probe" — true probe recency is in the metrics. - Deterministic instance names are
proxy-+ 16 chars of base32(SHA-256(CR UID)): legal for both GCP ([a-z2-7]⊂[-a-z0-9], 22 ≤ 63 chars) and Pod names, 80 bits against birthday collisions at a fleet of tens. The replacement VM therefore has the same name as the one being deleted — which is why replacement polls to NotFound before recreating instead of racing a 409. bannedandrate_limitedshare one cooldown window: a second duration knob the spec doesn't ask for; the report's semantic difference is preserved in the API but not the store.- Report targets fall back report → lease → global, so a client that leased with a target can't accidentally poison the proxy's global pool by omitting the target in its report.
- The 409 body's
consideredcounts unhealthy matches too (the store only ever sees healthy candidates):considered = atCapacity + inCooldown + unhealthy + eligible-but-outranked, keeping the numbers additive for a human debugging "why no proxy?". - TTLs above
--max-lease-ttlare a 400, not a silent clamp — a client asking for a week should find out. - Discovery is not leader-elected and ships
replicas: 1: caches start before non-leader-election runnables (verified in controller-runtime's ordering), and a leader-elected server would leave non-leader replicas as broken Service endpoints. One replica because lease state is per-process. - GCP
Createrequires zone, machineType, and image and failsErrPermanentnaming the missing field — inventing machine-type defaults would silently create billable VMs of arbitrary shape. - Unknown GCP instance statuses map to
Stopped: the reconciler's answer to Stopped is delete-and-recreate, the always-safe move for cattle when the API grows a new state. - Kubernetes 403s classify as
ErrPermanenteven though quota exhaustion also surfaces as 403 (indistinguishable from RBAC denial inapierrors): not hammering an API server that may never allow the request is the safer default; a real ResourceQuota 403 forgoes the gentler quota backoff. Documented at the classification site. - GC kills log at Info with a
WARNING:prefix — logr has no Warn level; the plan's "log at Warn" is met in spirit with provider, providerID, and UID always attached. Same convention as the discovery server's empty-token warning. - GC trusts only provable orphans: instances without the UID label
are never deleted, a CR with a deletionTimestamp still counts as live
(its finalizer owns that deletion), and an unreadable Proxy list skips
the whole sweep. The namespace guard refuses to sweep a
namespace-restricted cache without
--gc-allow-namespaced. - Cloud-init Secrets must carry
crawl.example.com/cloud-init: "true": the manager caches only labelled Secrets (the operator holds cluster-wide Secret read RBAC — an unrestricted cache would hold every Secret in scope). Unlabelled referenced Secrets are invisible by construction, surfacing asCloudInitError. - Events RBAC from the plan is omitted: nothing wires an EventRecorder in the prototype, and granting verbs nothing uses would be RBAC lint noise. Add the marker together with the recorder if events land later.
- logr, not slog, inside controller paths: the repo convention says
slog, butlog.FromContext(ctx)hands controller-runtime's logr logger to everything running under the manager — fighting that would mean two logging systems in one process. Noted as a deviation rather than silently ignored.